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Similarly, Hurricane Sandy (2012) caused limited damage home), cell phones, and many business telecommunication
to telecommunications infrastructure. Power loss was the systems have batteries or need other power sources.
main source of outages in both hurricanes. (Kwasinksi
2013). There is promise in emerging power technologies, such as
microgrids that have local power sources independent of
Telecommunications infrastructure tends towards physical the commercial power grid—as well in telecommunications
resiliency, but it isn’t invulnerable. It has a range of risks, equipment and technologies that are less dependent on
such as limited redundancy and legacy equipment in parts commercial power. (Telecommunications exchange offices
of networks, the vastness of telecommunications networks are essentially microgrids with batteries and generators,
to be protected, and critical dependencies, such as power. though they generally last only a few days without fuel or
commercial power.)
Damage to supporting infrastructure
Telecommunications has heavy dependency on other critical What happens to telecommunications
infrastructure and services: access to transport routes to services?
service and repair facilities In the Great East Japan
and equipment, water supply Earthquake, there was
for some cooling systems widespread service
for network buildings, and Loss of commercial power was responsible for impairment, most dramatically
procurement of equipment, over half, and by some estimates up to 80%, of in the tsunami zone. About
such as portable generators telecommunications failures during the 2011 Great 10% of landlines (excluding
and fuel during commercial East Japan Earthquake. the failures of the ‘last mile’
power outages. that connects individual
homes and businesses) and
Power is by far the a fifth of wireless services
greatest dependency for were out of service, not an excessive loss of service given
telecommunications, and power outages usually cause more the scope of the disaster. Outages were much greater in
service outages than direct damage to telecommunications regions closer to the coast that were devastated by the
infrastructure. Power grids are vulnerable, more than tsunami, especially smaller, coastal communities where
telecommunications infrastructure, “due to their centralized there was little or no service (MIC 2011). Many of these
control and power generation architectures, in which little communities were essentially reduced to information
damage may lead to extensive outages.” In Hurricane Isaac, blackholes with no landline, wireless, or internet for as
for example, damage to a single pole caused most of the much as a week and more (Zimmerman and Coss 2012).
community of Grand Isle to lose power (Kwasinksi 2013). This is not uncommon. Smaller communities may be more
vulnerable to telecommunications outages because they
Loss of commercial power was responsible for over half, may have less network redundancy than larger communities
and by some estimates up to 80%, of telecommunications
and may have lower recovery priority in large-scale
failures during the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake, and disasters.
for the bulk of outages in the Christchurch, New Zealand
earthquake as well as in Service outages in the
Hurricanes Katrina, Sandy, Christchurch earthquake
and Dorian. An indicator of were mostly moderate,
the criticality of commercial Smaller communities may be more vulnerable some caused by direct
power is the fact that to telecommunications outages because they damage but most by the
telecommunications outages may have less network redundancy than larger loss of commercial power.
tend to peak a day or two communities and may have lower recovery priority Hurricanes Katrina and Sandy
after a disaster, in which in large-scale disasters. had more serious outages.
commercial power is lost, Almost half of the prime
as batteries and generators carrier’s 5 million landline
start to fail. Back-up power customers lost service in
capacity ranges across Katrina, and approximately
telecommunications facilities and equipment but is limited 25% of cell sites in the affected area lost service in Sandy
by space constraints and safety regulations. (Kwasinksi 2013). In Hurricane Dorian (2019), there was
wide-spread disruption to cellular service in Nova Scotia,
Power is also an issue at the customer level. Traditional due to damage to cellular towers and primarily to loss of
corded landline phones get their power from the power.
telecommunications exchange office and will continue to
work in a power outage (unless the exchange office loses Recovery of telecommunications services is generally
power). But cordless phones, VOIP phones (fibre to the expedient, mostly in conjunction with the restoral of

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